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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
Hazard Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), the Limited-Life Items List (LLIL), and the Single 
Point Failure (SPF) List were applied by System Safety and 
Reliability engineers on NASA’s Communications, 
Navigation, and Networking reConfigurable Testbed 
(CoNNeCT) Project.  The integrated approach involving cross 
reviews of these reports by System Safety, Reliability, and 
Design engineers resulted in the mitigation of all identified 
hazards.  The outcome was that the system met all the safety 
requirements it was required to meet. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) is developing an on-orbit, adaptable, Software 
Defined Radio (SDR) and Space Telecommunications Radio 
System (STRS).  It will be a test-bed facility on the 
International Space Station (ISS).  The purpose of this test-bed 
facility is to conduct a suite of experiments to advance 
technologies, reduce risk and enable future mission 
capabilities on the ISS.  The CoNNeCT Project will provide 
NASA, industry, other Government agencies, and academic 
partners the opportunity to develop communication, 
navigation, and networking technologies.  The development of 
reliable space communication links is crucial to future NASA 
exploration missions.  The current technology is based on 
reconfigurable, software defined radio platforms and the 
STRS Architecture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: SCAN Testbed 
The Nomenclature for CoNNeCT’s on orbit system is the 
term “SCAN Testbed”.  This term is used to clarify the system 
which will actually be launched in 2012. (See Figure 1) [1] 
2 CHALLENGES AND COMPLEXITIES OF CONNECT 
A critical objective of CoNNeCT is to advance the 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) for candidate spaceflight 
hardware and software.  The CoNNeCT system is comprised 
of the flight system (which is the space based element) and the 
ground system (which is the terrestrial based element).  The 
Flight System will launch on the H-II Transfer Vehicle (HTV-
3), and be installed on the Express Logistics Carrier (ELC) 3 
at the P3 truss location on the International Space Station 
(ISS).  (See Figure 2) 
The SCAN Testbed will be transferred and installed to the 
ELC via Extravehicular Robotics (EVR) activity.  
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) is the back-up.  The Flight 
System is designed to operate for a minimum of two years. 
 
Figure 2: Location of SCAN Testbed Installed On ISS 
What makes the application of safety and reliability 
techniques to CoNNeCT interesting is the intersection of 
constraints from schedule combined with the varied interests 
of the carriers (the HTV-3 and the ISS), the International 
Partners’ systems impacted by CoNNeCT, and the concurrent 
definition of requirements that CoNNeCT has to meet, as well 
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as the combination of hardware and software providers 
supplying the components that make up the entire CoNNeCT 
flight system. 
CoNNeCT began as a small, fast-track type project, where 
existing technology created for Lunar Robotic Orbiter (LRO) 
was utilized.  An example of one of the technologies involved 
is the Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier (TWTA), a high power 
signal amplifier, that is an exact design copy of one used on 
the LRO.  There are six difficult challenges for 
implementation of System Safety and Reliability on the 
CoNNeCT Project.  They are the following: 
1. Proto-flight development with an aggressive schedule 
constraint. 
2. Accelerated building and test of flight hardware and 
software. 
3. The number of International Space Station partners 
that will be impacted by the success or failure of 
CoNNeCT.  These are: the Japan Aerospace 
Exploration Agency (JAXA), the Canadian Space 
Agency (CSA), the European Space Agency (ESA), 
and the Russian Federal Space Agency (RKA, 
commonly called Roscosmos). 
4. Design requirements defining safe radio frequency 
(RF) limits for Ka-Band emissions were concurrently 
being developed by the ISS program. 
5. The SCAN Testbed software is developed by five 
organizations: Glenn Research Center (GRC), 
Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC); Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL); General Dynamics (GD), and 
Harris Corporation. 
6. System coordination of hardware that together 
comprises the SCAN Testbed comes from GRC, 
GSFC, JPL, GD, Harris Corporation, and Sierra 
Nevada Corporation (specifically SpaceDev). 
3 THE IMPORTANCE OF SAFETY AND RELIABILITY FOR 
CONNECT 
This is a payload that will provide an opportunity for 
many investigators to explore the capabilities of radios that 
can change their signal configurations.  That flexibility in 
signal configuration, combined with the ease of how the radio 
frequencies can impact so many other payloads, the ISS, and 
the visiting spacecraft vehicles, is the principle reason why 
system safety is so important. 
The need for reliable future space communication links 
drives the visibility of the payload and makes it extremely 
important.  The payload must function as advertised.  As a 
result of its impact on so many different users on ISS, it is 
crucial that the payload meets the NASA reliability 
requirements as well as the safety requirements of all affected 
parties. 
Utilizing reliability techniques ensures the payload will 
meet the planned mission objectives.  Identifying points where 
the payload could suffer a single point failure allows the 
project to investigate alternate means where mission 
objectives could still be accomplished.  Evaluation of the 
failure modes of various components and subsystems via the 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) provides an 
understanding of how the components fail, the worst case 
effects of the occurrence of failure modes, and the causes of 
the failure modes.  In particular, the FMEA identifies failure 
modes effects of very high severity: loss of payload mission, 
loss of payload hardware, and loss of life.  These high-
criticality failure modes overlap with the Hazard Analysis 
performed by System Safety engineers.  Thus we pursued an 
integrated approach: System Safety and Reliability engineers 
conducted cross-reviews of the FMEA and Hazard Analysis, 
as well as integration of the data provided by the LLIL and the 
SPF list. 
4 METHODOLOGY OF COMBINED APPLICATION 
What will be briefly touched upon in this section are some 
examples of data from the reliability and safety assessments 
that were used to support each other. 
At the beginning of the project development, application 
of system safety techniques, such as Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA), first identified the hazards associated with 
the system.  Followed by Subsystem and System Hazard 
Analysis, this knowledge gave the project a map towards 
working solutions for either eliminating or controlling the 
identified hazards.  The System Safety engineers also had to 
build upon their combined years of system safety expertise by 
learning the safety requirements and safety process for JAXA, 
since the payload would be transported on the HTV. 
The hazard dealing with inadvertent release of RF energy 
is the most complex for the project and is the topic that 
required the most ingenuity from the System Safety and 
Reliability engineers.  Control of this hazard involves 
identification of the range of the RF fields and their impact to 
stationary and non-stationary elements of ISS, as well as 
system control of the generated RF (how the system is turned 
on and off, and how accidental activation is prevented).  Some 
of the RF limits for potentially impacted hardware and 
systems, especially for non-US property such as the Russian 
vehicles and the Canadian robotic arm, were not defined and 
made finding design solutions that would meet requirements 
very difficult.  A few times, the project took their best guess 
and then had to work additional follow-on collaboration or 
even implement new design or operational changes to create 
closed solutions to these open problems.  This iteration 
approach sometimes forced revisit of the safety and reliability 
work to ensure the new solutions did not invalidate positive 
findings on other parts of the project.  The project’s control of 
how the RF energy was generated and shut off is a 
combination of hardware and software design features, 
operational controls by both the ground support personnel and 
the on-orbit crew, and physical controls that are provided 
external to the SCAN Testbed itself. 
A functional FMEA was developed for the project [2].  
The Basic Failure Conditions considered were: premature 
operation; failure to operate within specification or at a 
prescribed time; failure during operation, including failure to 
contain or store energy; and failure to cease operation at a 
prescribed time.  One identified failure mode from the 
assessment was the Avionics Subsystem 1553 digital 
input/output (DIO) cards connector pins failing open or 
shorted to ground.  The Critical Items List (CIL) that 
accompanied this FMEA had the 1553/DIO cards among the 
project’s higher level identified failure modes.  An example of 
how the System Safety and Reliability engineers increased 
their collective knowledge on this project is that during 
system-level testing, it was found that the DIO cards were the 
root cause of an uncommanded power-up of key components 
that are part of the control strategy to prevent the inadvertent 
release of RF energy.  The failure was due to a design defect 
of the cards themselves (not related to the pins), and the 
project had to work with the manufacturer to obtain a design 
solution that would no longer create that issue.  The solution 
was then presented to the Payload Safety Review Panel 
(PSRP) to demonstrate that the hazard would be controlled 
and that the project’s inhibits were still valid.  
Along with performing the FMEA, the LLIL/SPF 
document was prepared [3].  It became apparent that the flight 
system model design does not contain redundant subsystems 
based upon like-redundancy.  However, alternative paths for 
success existed.   
The Limited Life Items List was developed to identify 
hardware items that have an expected operating life or storage 
life that is less than the required operating life or storage life. 
Developing the list of Limited Life Items and a plan to address 
them was conducted fairly early in the design process in order 
to ensure reliable operation and mission success. 
There was one safety critical limited operating life item 
identified - the Avionics Subsystem memory bank and 
associated software that are used to control the RF energy 
hazard.  Taking into account the number of assumed use 
cycles per month against the need for a 2 year mission, the 
good bank availability, and a writing efficiency factor of 66%, 
the planned action and rationale was to accept the design as is 
since sufficient margin existed for life requirements. 
Ground rules were established to help define what 
constitutes a single point failure and how it could be 
addressed.  The CoNNeCT Project’s interpretation of SPF 
with respect to the CoNNeCT project is complete loss of 
mission (e.g., that all radios completely fail).  The design was 
evaluated for SPFs with the following ground rules: 
• If a failed component can be fixed, it is not a SPF.  
Corrective maintenance action on the hardware is 
only applicable on the ground.  On-orbit, corrective 
maintenance action is limited to software. 
• An individual radio is not considered an SPF since 
the complete failure of one radio would not prevent 
the other 2 radios from operating. 
• The Antenna Pointing System (APS) gimbal is not 
considered an SPF since the S-band to ground link 
can operate. 
• The RF TX/RX system is not considered an SPF 
(including TWTA) because the L-band is available. 
• Similarly, the entire RF system is not considered an 
SPF because the Ethernet link with ISS can still 
operate. 
The analysis, with respect to the ground rules stated 
above, revealed that most SPFs are associated with the 
Avionics Subsystem.  In addition to performing routing and 
processing on SDR data, the Avionics Subsystem is required 
to power all the other sub-systems. 
The approach CoNNeCT has taken to address the SPF is 
to reduce the probability of an SPF occurring by using high 
reliability parts (the majority on the SPF List are Grade 2 or 
above).  Where the Grade 2 parts quality cannot be 
maintained, extra attention was devoted to that component via 
a thorough environmental stress screening, derating, and burn-
in testing.  Infant mortality on lower grade components was 
minimized though the 100 hr burn in requirement being 
enforced on all SCAN Testbed hardware. 
The results of all these assessments were vetted with the 
project and the system safety data was captured in safety data 
packages and presented to the PSRP.  But there could have 
been additional refinement if the two disciplines’ had further 
coordinated their findings.  The system safety and reliability 
work was conducted by different individuals over time, with 
personnel leaving and joining the project and passing the 
responsibilities with each change.  Each type of assessment, 
each view of the system, identified common issue areas such 
as the Avionics Subsystem.  There were also areas that were 
identified as potential problems by one discipline’s assessment 
but not the other’s.  An example is the hazard of not being 
able to maintain structural integrity over all expected loading 
conditions.  This type of issue was not touched upon in the 
FMEA, the LLIL, or the SPF list since it was assumed the 
hardware would be designed to meet the requirements.  In 
reality, this topic was the source of additional work and 
reverification/retest efforts when hardware provided by some 
of the third parties was found to be designed to the wrong 
structural loading requirements and had also been tested to the 
wrong verification loads. 
5 DISCUSSION 
The questions to ask are, “Were all hazards identified and 
mitigated?  Has the system been designed and constructed to 
meet the mission requirements?  Was all this activity 
effective?” 
For the first question, the project has completed multiple 
flight safety reviews and ground/launch safety reviews, and 
multiple Technical Interchange Meetings (TIMs) and working 
meetings with the safety panels.  All identified safety hazards 
have been mitigated.  During hardware build-up and 
verification activities, new hazards arose based on hardware 
failures or as new data was obtained that concluded some 
hazards originally thought non-credible were now applicable.  
Additional work was required to determine impact and 
undergo resolution.  The end result was that the project made 
the changes or worked issue resolutions with the proper 
authorities to ensure the system met all applicable safety 
requirements. 
The second question, similar to the first, involved 
evaluation against the planned mission objectives.  Through 
the multiple reliability assessments, potential weaknesses of 
the system were identified and the rationale for how the 
system could either be modified, tested, or accepted as is was 
captured in the documentation.  The story is complete of how 
the payload will meet the mission objectives of a 2 year life 
span as an external system on ISS and will provide multiple 
radio capability for investigators on Earth. 
The final question’s answer is derived from the answers 
to the first two questions.  By being able to answer in the 
affirmative to the first two questions, one may say, “Yes, the 
system safety and reliability work was effective, since the 
system safety and reliability requirements were met.” 
6 FUTURE WORK 
Launch of the HTV-3 is dependent on the ability of JAXA 
to respond to the recent earthquake and tsunami that occurred 
in March 2011.  The launch was originally planned for 
January 2012, but has since been moved to a later date.  But 
after the eventual shipment and launch of the flight system, the 
GRC SMA Organization will participate in a lessons learned 
session to discuss the effectiveness of the system safety and 
reliability effort.  New items learned by the System Safety and 
Reliability team during the development of this project: 
• JAXA safety design and process requirements 
• RF limits for all ISS stationary hardware, visiting 
vehicles to ISS, on-orbit robotic equipment, and EVA 
crews 
• ISS program processes for discussing and negotiating 
working solutions to system safety or reliability 
issues, especially if traditional solutions could not be 
implemented 
• New failure modes for components and software 
(thus increasing the knowledge base of the system 
safety and reliability team) 
• Difficulties that can occur when components and 
software for a system are provided by multiple 
parties – communication issues, subsystem 
integration problems under a tight schedule, and data 
needed for verifications not provided in a timely 
manner 
This new information, coupled with capturing the 
experiences of working such a complicated payload with so 
many types of Design and System engineers, will provide the 
GRC System Safety and Reliability team with valuable data 
that can be shared with discipline coworkers and SMA 
professionals that become involved with similar projects and 
payloads. 
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